Impact of Regime Type on Argentinean Central Government Budgetary Priorities 1961-82: A Test of the O'Donnell Thesis by Looney, Robert E.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
1989
Impact of Regime Type on Argentinean
Central Government Budgetary
Priorities 1961-82: A Test of the
O'Donnell Thesis
Looney, Robert. E.
Impact of Regime Type on Argentinean Central Government Budgetary Priorities 1961-82: A
Test of the O'Donnell Thesis, (International Journal of Public Administration, vol 12, no. 1 1989).
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/40686
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Yolwne 12, Nwnbec 1, 1989 
CONTENTS 
Culturally Based Goal Displacement in an Egyptian FP-MCJf Program. . . . 1 
H. Feirnu1n aud N. Langworthy 
State Urban Enterprise Zones: Origin, Po)jcy Context1 
and Administrative Constraints . .... ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 
G, Riposa 
Impact of Regime Type on Alli•ntinean Central Government 
Budgctaty Priorities 1961-82: A Test of the O'Donnell Thesis. • . . . . . . . 4S 
R. E. Looney 
Bureaucracy, Det"elopmcnt, and Reghne·Politic$: The Case of ltan. . . . . . 79 
A. Farazu1and 
Citizen Versus Conswner Representation: Lessons from the 
Neighborhood Bealth Center E><perienee . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . . 113 
J. E. /At ting 
Printization in D•veloping Countries: Ideal and Reality . . . • . . . . • . . . 137 
G.·C. Lim and R. J. Moore 
Book Review . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
MARCEL DEKKER, INC. New York and Basel 
Contributions to this joumol are published fre·e of charae 
INT'L. J. OF PUB. ADMIN., 12(1) 45-77 (1989) 
IMPACT or REGIME TYPE OH ARGENTINEAN 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUDGETARY PRIORITIES 1961-82: 
A TEST OF THE O'DONNELL THESIS 
Robert E. Looney 
Professor, National Security Affairs 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
ABSTRACT 
A large body of literature on Argentina 
suggests that transitions from military to 
civilian regimes bring about fundamental 
changes in policy-making in general and in 
economic, social, and military priorities in 
particular. This view has been developed by 
O'Donnell in his path breaking thesis about 
the emergence of new forms of 
authoritarianism in Latin America. According 
to O'Donnell each successive government is an 
alliance of various distinct interest groups. 
Each alliance is imbued with a distinct sense 
of what should be done and at whose expense 
and translates the goals and interests of the 
members of the coalition into public 
policies. 
The purpose of this paper is to test the 
O'Donnell thesis i.e., to determine the 
possible existence and nature of structural 
changes in the government's budgetary 
priorities associated with regime change. 
The empirical results yield considerable 
support to the general thesis that regime 
type in Argentina has a major impact on the 
amount and relative share of resources 
allocated to defense and socioeconomic 
activities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A sharp change in general economic policies appears 
to be taking place in Argentina following the demise of 
the 1976-83 military regime and the restoration of 
democracy. The changes are apparently not merely 
ideological--a shift from neo-liberal macro-economic 
policies to more conventional Keynesian type policies--
but also involve budgetary priorities with a shift in 
emphasis away from military and military related 
towards social and welfare-related expenditures, 
allocations. Clearly implied in this shift is the 
presumption that civilian regimes in Argentina tend to 
pursue markedly different economic pol~cies than their 
milita~ counterparts. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine by means of 
statical analysis, the patterns of budgetary 
allocations associated with regime type in Argentina 
over the period 1961-82( 1). The main thrust of the 
analysis is to determine the possible existence and 
nature of structural changes in the government's 
budgetary priorities associated with regime change. 
THE O'DONNELL THESIS 
A wide body of literature on Argentina suggests that 
transitions from military to civilian regimes bring 
about fundamental changes in policy-making in general 
and economic-social priorities in particular. This 
view has been developed by O'Donnell [ 2 I in his path 
breaking thesis about the emergence of new forms of 
authoritarianism in Latin America. According to 
O'Donnell, particular types of economic and social 
crisis tend to 
1. be associated with each phase of modernization. 
2. bring a new dominant coalition to power and 
produce a distinct type of authoritarian rule. 
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Each alliance comes to power imbued with a distinct 
sense of what should be done at whose expense, 
consolidates its control, centralizes power and 
authority, seals off the arena to non-coalition 
members, exercises unconstrained control over the 
policy process and translates the goals and interests 
of the members of the coalition into public policies. 
Coalition members benefit from public policies; non-
coalition members bear the costs. Authoritarianism in 
general and populist and bureaucratic authoritarianism 
in particular are seen as the response which different 
sets of elites take in reaction to crises engendered by 
different phases of modernization(3]. 
A causal relationship exists among economic stages, 
politics and public policies; the "elective affinity" 
is close. As a consequence, questions of possible 
conflicts between economics and politics, or between 
politics and policies never arise. Indeed, different 
types of authoritarianism are defined jointly on the 
basis of certain economic stages, coalitions and public 
policies ( 4 J. 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian model as applied by 
O'Donnell has the following characteristics[SJ: 
1. Economic State: capital/durable consumer goods, 
import substitution industrialization; 
2. Coalition: segments of the military, large and 
efficient domestic industrialists, foreign 
capital, technocrats in public sector; 
3. Policies: 
a) promotion of capital (basic) / durable 
consumer goods industries and modernization 
of their infrastructure; 
b > conservative budgetary and restrictive 
monetary policies combined with efforts to 
increase tax revenues; 
c) decreases in overall public spending; 
d) decreases in public employment; 
e> efforts to impose a rational calculus on 
policy-making; 
f) efforts to stop or regress political 






sector. Redistribution is seen as 
detrimental to the provision of sufficient 
investment capital; 
decreases in social welfare benefits; 
efforts to demobilize and exclude th~ popular 
sectors both economically and politically, 
and 
i) increases in military spending to control 
actual or expected social unrest and threats 
to domestic security. 
critical variable identified by O'Donnell as 
conditioning the development of bureaucratic-
authoritarianism is the level of perceived threat to 
the existing socioeconomic order generated by the pre-
coup . crisis [ 6]. The level of prior threat not only 
represents 
view, it 
originating circumstance; in 
. 




differences among cases. 
state and accounts for 
The economic and political 
d th bureaucratic-authoritarian crises that prece e e 
administration have variations from one case to another 
that have repercussions on the specific characteristics 
of the government that results[7J. 
Of interest here is that O'Donnell also argues that 
l · · ti· ons i· n economic policies threat levels exp ain varia 
and economic performance. The short-term consequences 
of a higher threat level specifically include[S]: 








more immediate inflows of external public 
assistance to help stabilize the economy; 
more difficulty in reducing the rate of 
inflation to acceptable levels; 
less capacity of the state to invest; 
less probability of rapidly restoring economic 
growth; . d 
slower restoration of investor confidence, an . 
by implication, less immediate success in 
attracting long-term private investment. 
Clearly, the 1966 Argentine military regime was a low 
threat bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regime was a high-threat example. 
case, while the 1976 
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O'Donnell has observed that the economic policies of 
the military incorporate fundamental components. 
Disinflation through fiscal-monetary orthodoxy is used, 
in part, to break the political mobilization of labor 
unions through the creation of additional slack in 
labor markets. Disinflation is also necessitated by 
the second characteristic of economic policy under 
military authoritarianism, a trend toward 
transnationalization of the production structure, 
particularly heavy industry. Because of the greater 
dependence of heavy industry on external sources of 
capital, stabilization is a necessary precondition for 
the extension of additional foreign loans; 
time, the successive phases of import 
at the same 
substitution 
require higher rates of capital accumulation because of 
the capital intensity of industry and consequent 
reductions in real wages[9]. 
The similarity of the orthodox economic policies 
introduced by authoritarian regimes in the 1970s has 
been well documented[lO]. If, in fact, similar macro-
economic policies carry over to a similar approach 
towards budgetary allocations and priorities, the 
O'Donnell thesis would preduct cutbacks in social 
services and welfare in bureaucratic authoritarian 
regimes to aid the stabilization efforts with increased 
military expenditures to shore up domestic security. 
One would predict, therefore, based on the change in 
regimes from a high-threat bureaucratic-authoritarian 
to a civilian regime in 1984, a marked shift downward 
in military expenditures. 
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL EXAMIKATIOKS OF REGIME TYPE AKD 
BUDGETARY PRIORITIES 
This conclusion also has some empirical validity. 
In a recent examination of civilian and military 
50 LOONEY 
regimes in ten Latin American countries. Diskson found 
that [ 11 1' 
1. Military regimes appear to 












civilian regimes appear to have been. more 
developmentally oriented than military regimes; 
Military regimes were inclined to spend less and 
run lower deficits, even though they spent more 
on the military; 
Military regimes also 
increase in the cost 
stronger international 
the central bank, and 
showed a lower rate of 
of living and maintained 
liquidity positions for 
Civilian regimes spent more, 






the other hand, a number of· empirical studies 
these lines have provided little empirical 
th O'D 11 thesi·s or for the general support for e onne , 
proposition that military regimes tend to expand 
military budgets over and above what one might predict 
a civilian regime would undertake. Most[12], for 
example, found little change in military expenditures 
th · mi·c vari·ables i·n Argentina or most o er socioecno 
during the post-1966 transition to bureaucratic-
authoritarian rule from a civilian regime. Other 
studies also concluded that governments which are 
dominated by the military produce socioecnomic results 
similar to those produced by civilian quite 
regimes[13]. As P. Schmitter commented in summarizing 
this research[14): 
The conclusions have tended to be similar 
whether arrived at by statistical inference, 
from synchronic correlations across units, ~r 
descriptive evaluation based on diachronic 
counter-factual assumptions within units. We 
have been led to believe that the relatively 
constant features of ednological setting and 
underlying class interests and or the 
persistence of subtle machinations by 
informal cliques and patron-client dyads 
impose such narrow and fixed parame~ers upon 
performance that it makes no real difference 
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if political structures are more or less 
centralized, more or less competitive, or 
more or less participatory. Such an 
overdetermined system (provided the three 
layers of determinism are self-reinforcing) 
will produce the same outputs and outcomes--
i. e., benefit the same interests--in any case 
short of violent revolution. 
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A number of other studies have found the same 
pattern. 
Jackman[ 15 I examining seventy-seven Third World 
countries using co-variance analysis concluded 
that C 16 I: 
military intervention in the politics of the 
Third World has no unique effects on social 
change, regardless of either the level of 
economic development or geographic region. 
Two cross-national aggregate studies by McKinlay and 
Cohan[17) based on an initial sample of 115 countries 
reached conclusions that were very similar to 
Jackman's. In the first of these studies, McKinlay and 
Cohan compared the performance of military and civilian 
governments over the 1951-70 period, using indicators 
of annual change in per capita GMP, cost of living, 
food production, exports, primary education, military 
spending, and military size. They found that military 
regimes performed significantly better than civilian in 
the poorest countries (al though their evidence also 
suggests that in Latin American, military regimes 
perform somewhat better than their civilian 
counterparts). However, McKinlay and Cohan concluded 
that military regimes do not in the aggregate form a 
distinctive regime type in terms of performance. They 
found that the rate of growth of primary education was 
the only overall significant performance difference 
between military and civilian regimes. 
The second study by McKinlay and Cohan covering the 
1961-70 period used different data and statistical 
52 LOONEY 
techniques to arrive at the same basic conclusion. In 
this study, McKinlay and Cohan found evidence that 
military regimes tend to occupy a weaker international 
trading position than their civilian counterparts, but 
that their economic performance rates, measured in 
terms of the rate of growth of per capita GKP cost of 
living and exports, compared favorably with non-
civilian regimes only by their lower levels of 
political activity and higher levels of political 
change. 
The most extensive study to date of the consequences 
of regime differences in Latin America, a study by P. 
Schmitter[18), partially confirms the findings of these 
cross-regional studies. Using both cross-sectional and 
longitudinal data, Schmitter concluded that no regime 
type was exclusively linked with developmental success 
as measured by such indicators of performance as 
average annual percentage increases in inflation, 
exports, industrial production and per capita GKP. 
Military and non-competitive regimes were slightly 
more successful in curtailing inflation, increasing 
foreign exchange earnings and promoting economic 
growth, especially in industry; however, environmental 
factors, particularly dependence on foreign capital, 
aid and trade were more important in understanding the 
performance variations than were factors such as regime 
type. 
Regime type only appeared relevant for understanding 
variations in governmental allocation outputs as 
distinct from system performance C outcomes) . In 
particular, Schmitter found that military regimes in 
Latin America tend to spend less on social welfare, 
rely more heavily on indirect taxation as a source of 
government revenue, and extract fewer resources for the 
A TEST OF THE O'DONNELL THESIS 
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pursuit of publi"c poli"ci·es than c· ·1· ivi ian regimes. 
However, most correlations between regime type and 
policy outputs were weak, suppo t · th · r ing e view that 
regime differences are relatively unimportant for 
understanding policy differences in Latin America. 
A major study of Brazil also cast doubt on the 
relevance 
Hayes[ 19)' 
of regime differences. Margaret Daly 
detailed work on longitudinal changes in 
Brazilian national expendi· tuyes f 1 
• or examp e indicated 
that military and civilian regimes in Brazil have not 
differed extensively i·n thei·y · 
• economic goals and 
policy outputs. Compared to 





period were moye li"kely to d 
• spen money on social 
development and the civilian bureaucracy and less 
likely to spend funds on military equipment. However, 
all regimes in this period gave priority to national 
development 
development. 




particularly GDP, political confli· ct, · t primary expor 
earnings, inflation and debt service explain a high 
proportion of the variation in expenditure patterns 
over time. 
Finally, Ames and Goff have noted[20) 
If students of Latin American politics were 
to inventory verified propositions regarding 
the performance of Latin American regimes, 
the resulting list might not exceed zero. 
In summary while there is some evidence that the 
more recent bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Latin 
America tend to pursue similar macro-economic policies, 
recent research on budgetary priorities clearly 
suggests that underlying socioecnomic conditions may 
impose such severe constraints on political actors that 
it makes little difference whether they are civilian or 
military. Similar conclusions have been reached by 
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studies employing very different units of analysis and 
research strategies. 
Why do Latin Americanists argue that history has 
shown regime type to be irrelevant in affecting 
budgetary priorities In addition to the empirical 
work cited above, one line of argument stresses 
ecological constraints, and suggests that socioecnomic 
variables are more important in explaining policy 
differences than political variables. In particular' 
the dependency literature has emphasized the dynamics 
and structure of economic development in Latin America 
cannot be understood without taking into account 
factors such as imperial dominatio~. foreign investment 
and technology, foreign aid, and export demand 
factors that domestic policy makers cannot control 
directly[21). A major variant on this argument 
suggests that civilian and military regimes do not even 
have different policy orientations, either because the 
civilian-military dichotomy is totally artificial, or 
because the same class, sectoral, or status group 
interests control the govei:nment Cno matter who 
occupies the top positions). 
Finally, the policy relevance of system level 
characteristics have been questioned on the gi:ounds 
that factors such as operational systems and foi:mal 
institutional arrangements which may account for policy 
variations axe not systematically related to regime 
type or regime orientation(22]. 
Before concluding that Latin Americanists, who have 
expended considerable time and effort expanding the 
causes of i:egime vai:iations, have been totally 
misguided, it should be noted that all of the above-
mentioned empirical studies 




type has the 
same meaning aci:oss political units, time periods, and 
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even cultural regions, existing studies of public 
policy have built thier conclusions into their 
questions. Obviously, military regimes do not form a 
homogenous group. Military governments are reformist 
as well as reactionary, populist as well as 
authoritarian, personalist as well as corporatist. By 
aggi:egating all types of military regimes, much of the 
research to date has ensured that differences in regime 
type will appear irrelevant. Moreover, the use of the 
civilian military dichotomy has obscured possible 
overlaps between civilian and military governments. 
Officers may exercise substantial influence even if 
civilians are in top positions and vice vei:sa. 
In shoi:t, the literature is deeply divided on the 
basic theoretical 
pei:formance records 
those of civilian 
question: do the policies and 
of military regimes differ from 
regimes Much of the litei:ature 
suggests that they do, but disagi:ees on the natui:e of 
the differences, while much of the litei:ature suggests 
that they do not. In such a situation empii:ical tests 
taking into account some of the limitations noted above 
must ultimately be performed to throw additional light 
on the matter. 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR ARGEKTIKA 
Is there some statistical evidence for Argentina 
linking the pattern of military expenditures to regime 
type Simple and multiple regression analyses were 
performed on time-series data on the level of real 
military expenditures to determine the significance of 
regime type in accounting for fluctuations in militai:y 
expenditure over time(24). 
The regime type variables were treated through the 
use of dummy variables. During the period under 
examination, four regimes governed(25): 
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1. 1961-1965 pez:iod of de111ocz:acy; 
2. 1966-1972 fiz:st 111ilitaz:y z:egime; 
3. 1973-1976 Pez:onist z:egime; 
4. 1977-1982 second 111ilitaz:y z:egime. 
Thez:e is sufficient z:eason to believe that z:egime 
type does not have the same meaning ovez: time, i.e., 
the fiz:st and second militaz:y z:egimes might, in fact, 
have few similaz:ities with z:egaz:d to economic policy. 
The same could also be said foz: the elected Pez:onist 
civilian z:egime (1973-76) and the non-Pez:onist civilian 
z:egime (1961-65). At least eight logical 
z:epz:esentations of the 1961-82 z:egime types make sense 
(Table 1) with: 
1. DUMPB, z:epz:esenting the standaz:d civilian 
militaz:y dichotomy; 
2. DUMP, depicting stz:uctuz:al shifts upwaz:ds ovez: 
time between the 1960s z:egimes to the Pez:onists 
and finally the second militaz:y z:egime. If DUMP 
is statistically significant, the countz:y would 
have expez:ienced two shaz:p bz:eaks upwaz:d in the 
amount of funds allocated to militaz:y activities 
duz:ing the 1961-82 pez:iod; 
3. DUMPA, similaz: to DUMP, with thz:ee upwaz:d 
stz:uctuz:al shifts pz:oduced with z:egime changes, 
i.e., incz:eased militaz:ization ovez: time in 
Az:gentina; 
4. DUMPC assumes militaz:y z:egimes in Az:gentina to 
allocate significantly moz:e z:esouz:ces to defense 
than theiz: civilian countez:paz:ts, with the 
Pez:onists moz:e inclined to incz:ease defense than 
theiz: civilian countez:paz:ts in the eaz:ly 1960s; 
5. DUMPD is similaz: to DUMPC, but with the fiz:st 
civilian z:egime assumed moz:e pz:one to step up 
militaz:y spending than the Pez:onists; 
6. DUMPE assumes the Pez:onists least likely to give 
pz:ioz:ity to defense, followed by the fiz:st 
civilian z:egime, then the fiz:st militaz:y z:egime, 
with the second militaz:y z:egime most inclined to 
incz:eased militaz:y spending; 
7. DUMPF assumes no z:eal change in militaz:y 
allocation pz:ioz:ities in the 1960s, a shaz:p fall 
off undez: the civilian Pez:onist z:egi111e, and a 
majoz: shift upwaz:ds undez: the second militaz:y 
z:egi111e. This intez:pz:etation is often implicitly 
assumed in the qualitative litez:atuz:e; and 
8. DUMPG assuming again the Pez:onists least likely 
to undez:take militaz:y expendituz:es, followed by 

































































the fiz:st civilian z:egime. This dummy is used 
to test whethez: oz: not the fiz:st militaz:y z:egime 
was moz:e inclined to allocate funds foz: defense 
puz:poses that theiz: countez:paz:ts in the second 
militaz:y z:egime. 
Again, by themselves, these dummy vaz:iables az:e used 
to test whethez: any stz:uctuz:al shifts occuz:z:ed with 
changes in z:egime type. Real Centz:al Govez:nment 
z:evenues az:e used as a contz:ol vaz:iable to account foz: 
any movements in military expendi tuz:es that may have 
z:esulted simply fz:om corz:esponding revenue increases or 
declines. 
Regressions were performed for each dummy 
individually, and for three time periods: 
1. 1961-75; 
2. 1961-82; and 
3. 1966-82. 
to determine the extent to which the second military 
z:egime affected the pattez:n of militaz:y expendituz:es. 
The Cochz:aneOrcuutt[26] itez:ative pz:oceduz:e was 
employed to correct for any serial correlation in the 
ez:ror tez:ms. 
In genez:al the z:esults (Table 2) indicate that: 
1. Regime type is highly important in explaining 
the pattez:n of Az:gentine militaz:y expendituz:es 
over time (based on the high statistical 
significance of the dummy variable); 
2. Military z:egimes are much moz:e inclined (given 
Centz:al Govez:nment z:evenues) to allocate funds 
for defense (high statistical significance and 
positive sign for dummy variables in 1961-75, 
and 1966-82 sub-pez:iods; 
3. The Pez:onists were clearly the least likely to 
allocate funds for defense (high statistical 
significance of DUMPD and DUMPE foz: the 1961-75 
period); 
4. There has not been a pz:ogz:essive upwaz:d shift in 
military expenditures over time (statistical 
significance of DUMPA); 
5. Militaz:y allocations az:e not based simply on the 
dichotomy between civilian and militaz:y z:egimes 
(statistical significance of DUMPB ovez: the 
1961-82 pez:iod), and 
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6. It is not clear whether the second military 
regime was more inclined to allocate funds for 
defense than the first military regime (as 
suggested by the generally lower t values for 
1961-1982 period than for either sub-period and 
insignificant t value for DUMPF for the 1966-82 
sub-period). 
A structural shift in defense expenditures (a shift 
in the intercept of the regression equation) is one 
possible way to test for changing military priorities 
of alternative regime types. Another test would be to 
determine whether the propensity to spend out of 
revenues differed by regime type, ie., whether the 
slope of the regression line was statistically 
different for alternative regimes. To test for this 
possible phenomenon, an interaction variable[ 27) was 
created by multiplying each dummy variable defined 
above by the level of real Central Government revenues. 
The result is depicted by an X at the end of each 
dummy, i.e., DUMPX. Here, these variables are referred 
to as modification variables. 
When each modification variable was regressed 
together with the Central Government revenues, the 
results indicated that (Table 3): 
1. Again, regime type was highly important in 
accounting for the observed fluctuations over 
time in military expenditures; 
2. For the period as a whole, the rankings in 
ascending order of propensity to spend on 
defense are Peronists, first civilian regime, 
first military regime, and second military 
regime (high significance of DUMPEX for the 
period as a whole); 
3. The first military regime was less inclined to 
increase military expenditures with revenues 
than the first (insignificant value of DUMPGX 
for the period as a whole), and 
4. The country has not been more inclined over time 
to allocate existing funds for defense 
(insignificance of DUMPX and DUMPAX). 
Finally, tests were performed to determine whether 
regime change was more effective in influencing 
, 
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military expenditures through shifting the regression 
line while keeping the propensity to spend out of 
revenues constant. or shifting the regression line with 
no structural shift in the pattern of defense 
expenditures, or some combination of both. 
The results indicate (Table 4): 
1. A general tendency to increase the propensity of 
military expenditure with the second military 
regime (the consistently higher t values for the 
modification variables for the 1961-1982 period 
over the 1961-1975 period); 
2. The interaction variable, in general, is more 
indicative of structural change with regime type 
(than the dummy shift variable), i.e., there 
appears to be more of an inclination for the 
propensity to increase military expenditure to 
growth larger as regimes shift from civilian to 
military Cthe generally higher t values for the 
modification variables compared with the shift 
variables), and 
3. Political changes appear more important in 
affecting military expenditures than changes in 
government revenues, particularly when the 
second military regime is included in the 
analysis (as indicated by the generally 
insignificant t values for government revenues 
for the period as a whole). 
Clearly, if in fact regime change is so important in 
accounting for movements in the level of military 
expenditure, the share of the public sector budgetary 
allocations to defense ought to depict the same general 
pattern. Using government expenditure as a percent of 
gross domestic product as a control variable, 
regressions were performed using the political shift 
dummy. Again three time periods were considered: (a) 
1961-1975; (b) 1961-1982, and (c) 1966-1982. 
The results indicate (Table 5): 
1. The long-run trend is for military expenditures 
to decline as government expenditures increase 
relative to overall gross domestic product Cthe 
consistently negative sign on the control 
variable); 
2. The general pattern of structural shift upward 
in defense expenditures when regimes change from 
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civilian to military is confirmed Cthe positive 
signs on the shift variable); 
The second military regime appears to have had 
the highest inclination to increase the share of 
the budget going to defense, followed by the 
second military regime, the first civilian 
regime and finally the Peronists Cthe high 
statistical significance of DUMPE for the 
1961-1982 period); 
There may be little difference between the first 
civilian regime and the first military regime 
in allocating expenditures for defense (the high 
overall significance for DUMPF), and 
The most dramatic increases in government share 
occurred with the shift in regimes from Peronist 
to second military (the very high t value for 
DUMPF and DUMPE for 1966-82, compared with an 
insignificant value for 1961-75) . 
general, therefore, analysis of the share of 
government allocations going to defense confirm all the 
patterns discovered from the above analysis of total 
military expenditures. 
As with the level of military expenditures, 
regressions were performed to determine whether the 
slope of the regression line[28) changed with regime . 
The results (Table 6) confirm that regime changes 
have a strong impact on the manner in which the Central 
Government allocates funds for defense. In general: 
1. There is a strong propensity to increase 
military expenditures when a shift from civilian 
to military regime takes place and vice versa 
Cthe statistically significant and positive t 
values for the 1961-1982 period in all cases); 
2. The shift towards an increased propensity to 
spend was fairly weak and perhaps insignificant 
for the first change from civilian to military 
regime Cthe values of t slightly under 2. 0 for 
the dummy variables for the 1961-1975 period); 
3. A strong shift in the propensity to increase 
military expenditures under the second military 
regime existed (the high and positive t values 
for the 1966-1982 period); 
ti. In terms of an increased tendency to spend on 
defense, the second military regime was most 
inclined, followed by the first military regime, 
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A TEST OF THE O'DONNELL THESIS 67 
5. Again, the:re is not st:rong evidence that the 
:fi:rst civilian and fi:rst milita:ry :regimes had 
statistically diffe:rent p:ropensities to spend on 
defense (statistically significant DUMPX for 
1961-1975 and generally insignificant dummys for 
1961-1975) . 
The combined effects (Table 7) of the dummy (shift 
in slope) and modification (change in slope) were also 
tested to determine the overall manne:r in which changes 
in politic al regime impacted on defense expenditures. 
In gene:ral: 
1. The major impact of political change appea:rs to 
be in affecting the propensity to spend on 
milita:i:y activities (the modification va:riable 
tends to be statistically significant while the 
political shift variable is not); 
2. Again, the :results show no real secular trend 
upward or downward in the p:ropensity to change 
milita:ry expenditures f:rom :regime to regime 
(insignificance of DUMPA, DUMPAX fo:r 1961-1982); 
3. The highest t value for the 1966-1985 period was 
ob C.ained assuming both mili ta:ry regimes having 
the same propensity to spend on defense 
(DUMPDX), but slightly higher t values for the 
period as a whole we:re obtained assuming a 
highe:r p:ropensity on the part of the second 
milita:ry regime CDUMPEX, DUMPFX), and 
4. The fi:rst military :regime and fi:rst civilian 
:regime were quite similar in their p:ropensity to 
spend on defense (statistical significance of 
DUMPX, 1961-1975, DUMPFX, 1961-1982), 
particularly when the 1961-1975 period was 
examined. The first military regime did tend to 
have a higher propensity than the first civilian 
regime to spend on defense in the context of the 
period as a whole (statistical significance of 
DUMPBX, DUMPEX). 
Beginning in 1972, the sha:re of government budget 
a·llocated to servicing the public sector's debt 
increased d:ramatically from 0.1 pe:rcent in 1971 to 4.4 
percent in 1972. This sha:i:e continued to inc:rease to 
11.5 percent in 1976, 16.3 pe:rcent in 1980, and 37.1 
percent in 1982. It must be argued that this rapid 
inc:rease in debt service payments tended to affect the 
share Of defense in the gove:rnment's budget, 








"'"'"' ,.._co co 





'° °' °' 






I I I 
---
"'"'"' ,.._co co 
I I I 
........ '° ~'°"' 
°'°'°' ........ -
o;:::o 0"''° MOO 
---
oo;r:: 
"'°' °' NMM 
I I I 
---
"'"'"' ..... co co 
I I I 
........ '° 
'°"' '° 
°' °' °' ............ 
Gr::~ <OM.-< 
~~~ 
I I I 
---
"'"'"' ,.._co co 
I I I 
'""''""'"' 
'°"' '° 
°' °'"' _,... .... 
"'"'"' ...... co co 







1.0 C7H71 ..- 0 
• •• G.I 















• • • E 
NNN-






















A TEST OF THE O'DONNELL THESIS 69 
systematic bias in the results, presumably 
underestimating the impact of the second military 
regime on defense allocations . 
To determine whether the results presented above 
were significantly affected by the rapid build-up of 
debt service obligations, regressions were run with 
defense share computed as the percent of the budget 
that was not related to debt servicing. Again, three 
sets of regressions were estimated: (a) the shift in 
military expenditures with regime change, (b) the 
modification of the propensity to increase defense 
expenditures with regime change, and (c) a combined 
shift-modification analysis . 
The results of the shift analysis (Table 8) again 
show: 
5. There is no trend upwards or downwards with 
regime change; 
6. The pattern of increase jn military expenditures 
with changes from civilian to military regimes 
7. 
is much clearer than was the case when 
government debt servicing was included in the 
budget for computing the share of defense (much 
higher t values and r2--especially in the 
1966-1982 period); 
The ranking (DUMPE) of second military, first 
military, first civilian, and Peronist in terms 
of inclination to spend on defense is extremely 
strong statistically, but is contradicted by 
DUMPF which assumes no difference in the first 
military and first civilian regimes, and 
8. The increase in military expenditures by the 
second military regime is particularly striking 
when the 1966-1982 period is considered. 
The same general results were obtained from the 
modification (Table 9) and combined modification and 
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A TEST OF THE O'DONNELL THESIS 71 
The general picture that emerges from the last three 
sets of regressions (Tables 8,9,10) is that DUMPF 
provides the best depiction of military regimes, 
particularly over the whole (1961-1982) period . 
SUMMARY 
In summary, the analysis presented above indicates 
that either DUMPE or DUMPF perform best in 
differentiating Argentine regimes, with respect to 
their propensities to spend on defense . 
appears that: 
Overall, it 
1. With regard to the level of military 
expenditures (Table 2), DUMPE is the superior 
shift dummy, particularly with respect to the 
1966-1982 period and also (Table 3) the superior 
modifying dummy; 
2. Explanations of the share of defense in the 
government budget including debt servicing show 
little difference between DUMPE and DUMPF for 
either the shift (Table 5) or modification 
variables (Table 6); 
3. The share of defense in the non-debt service 
items of the budget shows that DUMPF out-
performs DUMPE on the shift (Table 8) of 
military expenditures with regime change, but on 
the modification of military expenditures (Table 
9), it only out-performs DUMPE for the 1961-82 
period, with DUMPE superior for the 1966-1982 
period; 
4. Using DUMPE for explaining the level of military 
expenditures, it appears that the modification 
influence of regime change is stronger (Table 4) 
than a structural shifting of defense 
expenditures to a higher level of revenues; that 
is, military regimes have stronger propensity 
to spend out of changes in revenues over time 
than their civilian counterparts, but not 
necessarily to spend a higher portion of 
existing revenues, and 
5. Again using DUMPE for depicting political 
change, it appears (Table 10) that military 
regimes after 1966 not only produced a 
structural shift upwards in the share of the 
budget allocated to defense, but, in addition, 
increased the share of defense budget as 
government expenditures to defense increased. 
..... 
TABLF 9 ... 
ARGENTINA' IMPACT OF POLITICAL CHANGE ON THE SHARE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE NON CDT SERVICE 
CENTRAL GOVERlf1ENT BUDGETARY ITEMS, MODIFICATION ANALYSIS, 1961-1982 
( I • t statistic 
-- ----is-o1T£1ca1 GOvernmen-t 
Mod1f1cat1on Expend! tures Statistics 
Period Variable as a 't of GDP RHO r2 F' ow 
-OLM PX 
1961-75 mn (-0.14) ( 1.52) o.521 5.57 1.68 
1961-82 ( 1.60) (-1.23) (4.28) 0.131 1.36 1.68 
1966-82 (0.19) (-2.65) (12.77) o.351 3.25 1.47 
DLMPAX 
1961-75 T-T:-58) (0.25) ( 1.10) o.519 5.40 1.60 
1961-82 (0.43) (- .92) ( 11. 75) · 0.112 1.89 1.57 
1966-82 (-0.18) (-2.58) (13.09) 0.354 3.28 1.34 
DLMPBX 
1961-75 -rr:ni (-2 .11) (2.271 C.394 3.2~ l. 61 
1961-82 (2.94) (-0.98) ( 5.59) 0.354 4.93 2.16 
1966-82 (9.85) (3.92) (-1.42) 0.914 63.96 1.77 
DLMPCX 
1961-75 ~) (-2.47) (2.26) o.362 2.83 1.66 
1961-82 ( 1.85) (-1. 95) (9.68) 0.278 3.46 1.81 
1966-82 (7.42) ( 1. 37) (-1.02) 0.859 36. 71 2.01 
DLMPDX 
1961-75 TlJ.m" (-1.90) (1.92) o.391 3.22 1.64 
1961-82 (3.20) (-0.37) (4.06) 0.365 5.18 2.25 
1966-82 (9.85) (3.92) (-1.42)' 0.914 63.96 1.77 
DLMPE X 
1961- 75 1-:r-:-m {0.98) ( 1.92) o.391' 3.22 1.64 
1961-82 (4.12) (-0.69) (2.83) 0.491 8.68 2 .31 
1966-82 (13.58) (0.62) (-2.15) 0.952 121. 26 1.96 
DLMPF'X 
1961-75 w.m (-1.57) (1.60) o.397 3.29 1.66 
1961-82 ( 5.47) (-1.18) (1.35) 0.655 17 .10 2.10 
1966-82 ( 11.87) (-1.16) (-1.61) 0.938 92.21 1.93 
DLMPGX 
1961-75 n:-m (-1.97) 92.06) 0.390 3.20 1.64 
1961-82 (2.25) (-1.52) (10.87) 0.340 4.65 1.99 
1966-82 ( 4.97) (3.97) (0.14) 0.725 15.86 1.88 
r 
NOTES: Regreessions made using Cochrane-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for serial correlations. 
0 
0 
Defense share canputed as the proportion of the government budget excluding debt service payments. :z: 
Political mod1f1cat1on variables formed by multiplying respective political variable by the level of 
!'! 
central government revenues 1n constant ( 1980) prices. 
-< 
TABLF 10 > 
..,i 
ARGENTINA: IMPACT OF POLITICAL CHANGE ON THE SHARE OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN THE !'! en 
NON-DEBT SERVICE CENTRAL GOVERlf1ENT BUDGETARY ITEMS, SHIFT AND MODIFICATION ANALYSIS, 1961-8? ..,i 
( ) • t statistic 0 
Poli ti cal Po11tlca1 Government ..., 
Shift Modi f1cat1on Expend! tures Statfstfcs ..,i 
Period Variable Vari ab le '.l of GDP RHO r2 F' DW :c 
DLMP Dl1'1PX !'! 
1961-75 Tr.77) ~O) (0.36) (2.60) 0.68A 6.62 1.52 0 
1961-82 (0.97) (-0.32) (-1.44) (5.69) 0.163 0.97 1.55 -
1966-82 (O. 78) (-0.57) (-2 .55) (12.771 0.383 2.48 1.26 8 
DLMPA DLMPAX :z: :z: 1961-75 ~) l-J.n) (0.28) (2.24) 0.67 6 •. 13 1.26 !'! 
1961-82 (1.77) (-0.80) (-1. g5) (7°.65) 0.266 1.81 1.35 r r 1966-82 ( 1.02) (-0.86) (-2 .45) (12.14) 0.398 2.65 1.14 
DLMPB DLMPBX ..,i :c 
1961- 75 ~) ~) (-2.08) (2.31) 0.411 2.09 1.50 !'! 
1961-82 (-0.25) (1.08) (-0.82) (4.97) 0.355 2.76 2.21 en 
.... 
1966-82. (-0.21) (2.38) (2.25) (-1.36) 0.913 42.10 1.81 en 
DLMPC DLMPCX 
1965-75 Tr.RI 1-1"37) (-1.98) (2.78) 0.525 3.32 1.23 
1965-82 ( 1.28) (-0.40) (-0.40) (14. 66) 0.363 2.86 1.39 
1966-82 ( 1.91) (1.93) (2.47) (-1. 65) 0.908 39. 78 1. 76 
DLMPD DLMPDX 
1961-75 TlJ.gS) T-0":-nl (-1. 20) ( 1.86) 0.440 2.36 1.61 
I 961-82 (0.17) (0.76) (-0.30) (4.23) 0.363 2.84 2.26 
1961-82 (0.21) (2.38) (-2 .25) (-1. 36) 0.913 42.10 1.81 
DLMPE DLMPEX 
1961-75 W.g"S) T-0":-nl (-1.20) ( 1.86) 0.440 12.36 1.61 
1961-82 (0.36) (0.85) (-0.47) (2.83) 0.494 4.89 2.35 
1966-82 (2.05) (2.27) ( 1.41) (-3.69) 0.972 142.80 1.82 
DLMPF DLMPFX 
1961-75 TU:IBl T-ll':l'll l (-0.44) ( 1.10) 0.447 2.74 1. 73 
1961-82 { 1.69) {0.29) (-0.38) (0.24) 0.778 17 .60 2.04 
1966-82 (2.89) (0.64) (0.05) (-3.55) 0.972 141.03 2.04 
DI.MPG DLMPGX 
1961-75 1"0':791 T-'0':10) (-1.61) (1.99) 0.43 2.27 1.54 
1961-82 (0.43) (0.1~) (-1.58) (12 .93) 0.358 2.78 1.86 
1966-82 (-1.47) (2.72) (1.88) (-0.24) 0.797 15. 78 1.90 
MOTts: Regressions made using Cochrante-Orcutt iterative estimation procedure to correct for serial correlation. 
Defense share canputed as the proportion of the government budget excludin~ debt service payments. 
..... 
Political modification variables formed by multiplying the respective poli ical variables by the level I..> 
of central government revenues 1n constant (1980) prices. 
74 LOONEY 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical results presented above yield 
considerable support to the general thesis that regime 
type in Argentina has a major impact on the amount and 
share of resources devoted to defense. Military 
civilian regimes consistently outspent their 
counterparts on defense, and increased the share of 
defense in the Central Government budget. 
With respect to the O'Donnell thesis, the results 
lend strong support to the theory that the degree of 
threat preceding the assumption of power by a military 
regime influences its overall defense expenditures; all 
authoritarian regimes are not all.ke in the priority 
they place on defense Cas evidenced by the second 
military regime's outspending of the 
regime on defense). 
The results do not, however, 
first military 
give a sharp 
delineation between the first civilian and first 
military regimes with respect to their budgetary 
priorities for defense. 
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